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HISTORY OF DE JURE SEGREGATION IN
PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA
AND THE STATE OF MARYLAND PRIOR TO
1954 AND THE EQUALIZATION STRATEGY
John K Pierre*
As noted by Professor Alfreda Diamond, prior to the enactment
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, any
publicly funded education that states chose to provide to African-Amer-
icans would be in separate educational facilities. Because the
provision of publicly funded education is largely within the purvey of
State matters and not federal matters, the ratification of the Four-
teenth threatened the separate legal regimes in place that fostered de
jure segregation in elementary, secondary, and higher education. With
respect to higher education, even before the ratification of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Morrill Act of 1862 also threatened state legal
regimes that required education of African-Americans in separate fa-
cilities at publicly-funded land grant higher education institutions.
Even after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the growth of publicly funded education immediately after the Civil
War, African-Americans were largely excluded from accessing publicly
funded education. Racial separation in education, as well as all other
aspects of American life, was eventually given official constitutional
sanction when the United States Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson
established the precedent that a state could regulate the enjoyment of
their citizens solely and purely on the basis of race under the doctrine
of "separate but equal". Plessy endorsed the concept that a state could
enact laws that separated people merely because they were of different
races and that such laws did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Plessy essentially would lead to disenfranchisement of the rights of Af-
rican Americans and subject African Americans to racial
discrimination in education, housing, employment, public accommoda-
tions and all other facets of American life as an inferior caste.
* John K. Pierre is the Vice Chancellor, and a Professor of Law, at the Southern Uni-
versity Law Center. He has been on the faculty since 1990, and has been Vice Chancellor
since 2006. He is a member of the Louisiana State Bar Association and the Texas Bar
Association.
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Maryland history documents the existence of separation by race
in education thirty years prior to the decision announcing "separate
but equal" in Plessy. The idea of publicly funded education and free
and public education in Maryland began as early as 1825. While Mary-
land was an enslaving state, it was not part of the confederacy of states
that fought bitterly to preserve slavery during the Civil War. Mary-
land remained loyal to the Union during the Civil War and officially
abolished enslavement in 1864. Despite abolishing slavery prior to the
end of the Civil War, the state of Maryland nonetheless sanctioned sep-
arate public education based upon race. In 1866, two years after the
abolishment of slavery in Maryland and two years before the ratifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, the state school board
superintendant recommended that the state of Maryland provide sepa-
rate publicly funded education for African-American children. In the
decades following Plessy, Maryland followed the Supreme Court's "sep-
arate but equal" doctrine.
With respect to higher education, the state of Maryland insti-
tuted its system of publicly funded higher education in 1807 by
establishing the University of Maryland at Baltimore as a whites-only
institution. Maryland subsequently established four other whites-only
publicly funded higher education institutions as follows: (1) The Uni-
versity of Maryland established in 1865; (2) Towson University
established in 1866; (3) Frostburg State University established in
1898; and (4) Salisbury State University established in 1922.
Maryland's publicly-funded dual system of higher education be-
gan when it assumed control of the Baltimore Normal School in 1908.
Baltimore Normal School was an all black teacher's school which is
now Bowie State University. Thus, with the state assuming control of
the all black teacher's school, the state of Maryland began to offer pub-
licly-funded higher education opportunities to its African-American
citizens. This practice of offering higher education opportunities to Af-
rican-Americans via all black higher education institutions continued
when the state of Maryland acquired Princess Anne Academy in 1919.
Princess Anne Academy was acquired for establishing a land-grant in-
stitution for African-American students who were not allowed to enroll
at the whites-only Maryland Agricultural College at College Park, the
state's land-grant institution established under their Morrill Act of
1862. The Morrill Act of 1862 did not allow a state to discriminate
against African-Americans when it established a publicly funded land
grant institution. The Morrill Act was amended in 1890 to allow states
to qualify for federal land-grant funds by establishing or designating
all black publicly funded higher education land grant institutions in
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their respective states. Maryland was one of nineteen states to estab-
lish or designate all-black publicly-funded higher education
institutions as 1890 land grant institutions under the Morrill Act of
1890. Because the state of Maryland had to provide educational oppor-
tunities for African-American students to qualify for federal land-grant
funds, the state acquired Princess Anne Academy with the express
purpose of designating it as a land-grant institution for African-Ameri-
can students. Princess Anne Academy is now the University of
Maryland Eastern Shore.
The state continued to expand opportunities for African-Ameri-
cans in the state of Maryland in 1933 by passing legislation creating
partial scholarships for African-American students who desired to take
professional courses or other courses/degrees not offered to them at
Princess Anne Academy, but offered by Morgan College an all-black
private college located in Baltimore, Maryland. Additionally, these
scholarships were eventually later offered for African-Americans to at-
tend higher education institutions outside the state of Maryland to
take professional courses or other courses or degree programs not of-
fered at Princess Anne Academy.
As the demand for higher educational opportunities for African-
Americans continued to increase the state of Maryland eventually pur-
chased Morgan College. Maryland purchased Morgan, now Morgan
State University in 1939 for the express purpose to provide more
higher education opportunities for African-Americans in its segregated
system of higher education.
After the acquisition of Morgan, the State of Maryland again
expanded segregated higher education opportunities for African Amer-
icans in Maryland when the state assumed control of Coppin Teachers
College, now Coppin State University. Coppin was originally formed
by the Baltimore City School Board in 1900 to train African-American
elementary school teachers. It was operated as part of the Colored
High School in Baltimore until 1909 and was renamed in honor of
Frances Jackson Coppin, a former slave who became the first African-
American woman to earn a college degree in the U.S. In 1938, Coppin
became a four year school offering a B.S. in education.
While Maryland was deeply entrenched in enforcing segrega-
tion in all aspects of public life in the decades following Plessy, there
were activists in Maryland, and of course other states, who opposed the
"separate but equal" doctrine because African-Americans were victims
of deep and persistent inequalities in public accommodations and pub-
licly funded education. African-American professionals, particularly
teachers, were supportive of a strategy developed by Nathan Margold,
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the first staff attorney hired by the NAACP. The NAACP, formed to
fight Jim Crow in 1909, was aided by philanthropist Charles Garland
through the Garland Fund to support legal action to combat discrimi-
natory practices such as (a) racially restrictive covenants, (b) state-
sanctioned white primaries, (c) residential segregation, (d) Jim Crow
transportation, (e) discriminatory exclusion of African-Americans from
grand juries, (f) the significant disparities in the funding of black and
white schools and black and white student expenditures, and (g) the
significant differences in pay between African-American and white
teachers.
The NAACP used the funding it received from the Garland
Fund to hire Charles Hamilton Houston and Thurgood Marshall, in
addition to Margold. All three would eventually have significant roles
in developing the litigation strategy that would lead to the reversal of
Plessy and the "separate but equal" doctrine.
African-American teachers, despite having similar training and
credentials, were routinely paid much less than white teachers. This
was the practice in Maryland and other southern states. In Maryland,
for example, despite having uniform requirements for the certification
of both white and African-American teachers, the minimum salary for
African-American teachers was $280 per year in 1918, while the mini-
mum salary for white teachers was $600 per year at that time.
African-American teachers, who organized the State Colored
Teachers Association of Maryland in 1916, opposed inequality in
teacher pay. In 1918, the Association set the equalization of teacher
pay as one of its principal goals. The Association was unsuccessful
during the 1920's in convincing the Maryland legislature to end the
dual salary scales for African-American and white teachers, and in
convincing Maryland courts to equalize the pay between white and Af-
rican-American teachers in a 1923 suit against the Baltimore City
School Board.
The NAACP joined the movement against unequal teacher pay
in Maryland in 1936. It did so following a legal strategy that Margold
developed in 1931 to challenge school segregation. Based on a study
conducted by the NAACP on public school financing in southern states,
it was quite obvious that expenditures on black schools were quite
lower on a per capita basis when compared to per capita expenditures
for white schools. Hence, the strategy would have to focus on the fail-
ure of southern states to provide equal funds to black and white
schools. This strategy would force southern states to comply with
Plessy by focusing on the equal part of the "separate but equal" doc-
trine. Therefore, southern states would have to significantly increase
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the funding of black schools which would greatly increase the burden
on state budgets in southern states.
In 1933, Margold was appointed solicitor to the Department of
Interior by the newly inaugurated administration of President Frank-
lin Delano Roosevelt. That year, Charles Hamilton Houston succeeded
Margold as the chief attorney for the NAACP. Houston, who was a
native of Washington, D.C., graduated first from Amherst College and
then from Harvard Law School in the top five percent of his class. He
was the first African-American student on the Harvard Law Review.
Hamilton would eventually become dean of the Howard University
Law School and change the course of civil rights history and law in the
United States.
The actions of courageous African-American teachers in Mary-
land who agreed to act as plaintiffs in teacher pay equalization
complaints were extraordinary; any teacher who agreed to act as plain-
tiff in such suits ran a serious risk of being fired in the 1930's. Because
of their courage, the NAACP would be successful in its efforts to equal-
ize pay for African-American and white teachers in Maryland between
1936 and 1940 through lawsuits and negotiated settlements. Principal
among the successfully litigated cases in Maryland were cases filed by
Thurgood Marshall in Montgomery County Maryland in 1936, and in
Calvert County Maryland in 1937. Williams B. Gibbs, Jr. v. Bromme
and Elizabeth Brown v. Board of Education of Calvert County were
equalization suits that were settled out of court with the establishment
of plans to equalize teacher pay in Montgomery and Calvert counties
over time.
The most significant victory was garnered in Mills v. Board of
Education ofAnne Arundel County, a case filed by Marshall, Leon Ran-
som, and Williams Hastie on behalf of Walter Mills, an African-
American teacher hired by the Anne Arundel Country Board of Educa-
tion who was certified as a teacher and principal by the Maryland
State Board of Education. In Mills, the federal district court held that
the Anne Arundel County School Board had discriminated against
Mills in the practice of his profession solely on the basis of race. The
ruling in Mills prompted the Maryland legislature in 1941 to establish
a single salary schedule for all teachers. Hence, the victory in Mills
proved beneficial to all African-American teachers throughout the
state of Maryland. Additionally, African-American teachers in other
southern states would over time benefit from the decision as they at-
tacked discriminatory teacher pay practices in their efforts to equalize
pay.
85
FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW
The equalization strategy employed in teacher pay cases was
also employed simultaneously to attack segregation in higher educa-
tion. As noted by Professors Robert J. Coltrol, Raymond T. Diamond,
and Leland Ware, while segregation in higher education, specifically
graduate and professional education, was as common as segregation in
elementary and secondary education in southern states, there were
fewer graduate and professional programs. Hence, because there were
fewer such programs, concentrated litigation could be focused on those
programs that would produce much greater and dramatic results.
Hamilton and a young Marshall, as a special counsel to the
NAACP, favored graduate and professional school cases because they
believed that the disparities in graduate and professional schools
would resonate more easily with judges. They believed that it was eas-
ier to litigate such cases because (a) it was less difficult to prove that
discrimination was occurring in professional schools; (b) attacking seg-
regation in professional schools would not raise the same level of
emotional and/or political reaction that would occur in elementary and
secondary school settings; and (c) fewer individuals attended profes-
sional schools.
With respect to attacking segregation in professional schools, as
with the teacher equalization cases, Maryland again proved to provide
fertile soil to plow. The University of Maryland's law school was only
open to whites and there was no publicly funded law school in Mary-
land that trained African-American lawyers.
Like a ram in the bush, the right plaintiff appeared to the
NAACP in their pursuit to attack segregation in professional schools.
Donald Gaines Murray, a young African-American from Baltimore
sought admission to the University of Maryland Law School in 1935.
Murray was denied admission because of his race. Neither Maryland
nor the University had laws or rules mandating that the University of
Maryland be segregated. African-Americans were excluded from the
University of Maryland as a matter of policy. Donald Gaines Murray
was a graduate of Amherst College who came from a widely respected
Baltimore family. Hamilton, a graduate of Amherst himself, felt that
Murray was eminently qualified to attend the University of Maryland
Law School. Marshall, who also was denied admission into the Univer-
sity of Maryland Law School, relished the opportunity to file and win a
case against the University and its racist policies.
Houston and Marshall filed a mandamus proceeding in Balti-
more City Court to compel the University of Maryland Law School to
admit Murray as a student. In their pleading, Houston and Marshall
asserted that the refusal of the University of Maryland Law School to
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admit Murray as a student was not supported by the law or constitu-
tion of Maryland and violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. At trial, the state of Maryland stipulated
for the record that, but for his race, Murray was qualified to be admit-
ted to the law school. The stipulation was an important one, because
Murray's qualification for admission to the law school was a question
of fact and if the court found that he was not qualified, his case would
be moot. It was also revealed through the testimony of Dr. Raymond
Pearson, President of the University of Maryland, that (a) Murray had
applied through the proper channels and submitted all necessary
paperwork for admission to the law school, (b) if Murray had been a
white applicant, he would have been admitted, (c) Mexicans, Japanese,
Filipinos, and Indians were eligible for admission (d) African-Ameri-
cans were not admitted as a matter of state policy, and (e) the state
had created out-of-state scholarships for African Americans to attend
out-of-state institutions after Murray's application had been rejected.
After eliciting testimony from Roger Howell, Dean of the Uni-
versity of Maryland Law School, and other state officials who detailed
the inequalities in the education the State of Maryland provided to Af-
rican-American residents versus white residents, Houston, using the
wide latitude granted by Judge Eugene O'Dunne who presided over the
case as trial judge, turned his attention to other racial inequalities
which existed in Maryland. For example, Houston was able to elicit
testimony regarding race-based differences in teachers' salaries, gross
inequalities in the size and conditions of educational facilities, and the
fact that the school year for African-American students was at least
one month shorter than white students.
After the conclusion of testimony, Houston and Marshall shared
the closing argument. Marshall began by reminding Judge O'Dunne
that the state of Maryland had an obligation to provide equal educa-
tional opportunities to African-American students. He carefully
crafted his argument to stay within the confines of Plessy, asserting
that because the State of Maryland established a law school for its
white residents, it incurred a constitutional responsibility to provide a
separate and equal legal education for its African-American residents.
Houston continued Marshall's line of argument by pointing out
that Maryland's refusal to admit African-American applicants to its
law school without providing a separate and equal law school for Afri-
can Americans to attend violated Plessy's well-settled constitutional
demands. Houston emphasized that Plessy obligated the State of Ma-
ryland to make equal educational opportunities available to students
of all races, and the fact that the State of Maryland had created out-of-
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state scholarships for African-Americans to attend out-of-state institu-
tions did not satisfy the state's legal obligations under Plessy, because
the scholarships did not exist until after Murray's application was re-
jected and the number of the scholarships funded by the state could not
satisfy the demand for such scholarships.
After hearing the closing arguments from the Assistant Attor-
ney General for the State of Maryland, Judge O'Dunne issued a ruling
from the bench. Judge O'Dunne ruled that the University of Maryland
had a legal obligation to offer the same educational opportunities for
African-American students as those offered to whites and that the obli-
gation had not been fulfilled. Hence, the judge issued a writ of
mandamus ordering and compelling the University of Maryland to ad-
mit Murray into the incoming fall law school class.
The University of Maryland filed an appeal soon after being or-
dered to admit Murray into law school. The points of appeal raised by
Maryland included the following: (1) the University of Maryland was a
private entity rather than a state agency, and as a private entity was
not obligated to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution; (2) Murray had no right to sue in mandamus to
compel the University to admit him, and that his remedy, if any, is to
require the state to supply a law school for African-American residents
of Maryland; (3) even if the University of Maryland were deemed to be
a governmental unit, the state had satisfied its legal obligations under
Plessy by establishing a separate school for African-American students;
and (4) to the extent that the state was required to provide graduate
educational opportunities for African-American students, its obliga-
tions had been legally met by establishing a scholarship fund, which
African-Americans could use to attend schools outside of Maryland.
With respect to the argument that the University was a private
entity and that the law school was not a governmental agency, the
court found that the University of Maryland Law School was a private
institution only until 1920, when a state statute consolidated the law
school with the Maryland State College of Agriculture, an institution of
the state government. The Maryland Supreme Court concluded that
the law school was a branch or agency of state government. When the
court turned its attention to whether the educational facilities main-
tained for African-American students were equal to those provided for
to whites, the Plessy decision stated that "separation of the races must
nevertheless furnish equal treatment." The court also addressed the
issue of scholarships available to African-American students for out-of-
state institutions as a substitute for providing those students with the
facilities substantially equal to those furnished to the whites at the
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University of Maryland Law School. The court determined that be-
cause Maryland did not provide a law school for African-American
students, the main question in the case was whether African-American
students could be excluded from the University of Maryland Law
School because the state furnished African-American students scholar-
ships to study outside the state at law schools willing to admit such
students. The court found that the scholarships could not provide the
state with a defense because they were not available at the time Mur-
ray's application for admission was denied. Moreover, funds that were
subsequently appropriated were inadequate to satisfy the demands of
African-American students who had applied for aid, and even if an Af-
rican-American student received a scholarship, it would not have
covered the costs of attending law school in another state because the
scholarship only covered tuition differentials. Hence, the court held
that since there was a slender chance for an African-American to at-
tend a law school outside the state at an increased expense, the state
was not providing African-American students facilities substantially
equal to those provided whites at the law school. Finally, in consider-
ing the kind of remedy to fashion for Murray who had been denied
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, the court deter-
mined that the erection of a separate school for African-American
students was not available as an alternative remedy. The court conse-
quently affirmed Judge O'Dunne's order requiring Murray's admission
into the University of Maryland Law School.
Murray represented the first major victory for Houston, Mar-
shall and the NAACP in a higher education case. Houston and
Marshall had garnered a judgment that challenged Plessy indirectly at
its flanks. The racial barriers erected by Plessy were being shaved at
their sides, because the rulings in Murray by a Maryland state court
did not contravene any precedent that supported the "separate but
equal" doctrine. The ruling to admit Murray into the University of Ma-
ryland Law School was required by Plessy primarily because the state
of Maryland provided no other law school for him to attend. The fact
that the court ordered Murray's admission was noteworthy because the
court could have ordered the state of Maryland to establish a separate
law school for African American students and given it a period of time
to comply with the order. Alternately, the court could have required
the state of Maryland to modify its out-of-state scholarships for Afri-
can-American students by increasing the amount of the scholarships to
cover all the actual cost of attending schools in other states that per-
mitted African-American students to attend.
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Interestingly, as the Murray case was being litigated, the State
of Maryland took stops to fulfill previously unmet obligations under
the second Morrell Act passed by Congress in 1890 to ensure that
states provided land-grant education to African-Americans. The 1890
Land Grant Act expressly denied federal funding to institutions of
higher education "where a distinction of race or color is made in the
admissions of students." Conversely, however the Act stated that "the
establishment and maintenance of such colleges separately for white
and colored students shall be held to be in compliance with the provi-
sion of [this Act] if the funds be .... equitably divided." In response to
the 1890 Land Grant Act, the State of Maryland entered into a peculiar
arrangement to allegedly satisfy its obligations under Act.
In 1892, the State of Maryland discovered that it would not be
able to participate in the distribution of federal funds for education in
agriculture and mechanical arts under the Morrill Act if it did not
make provisions for African-Americans. The state employed a clever
strategy designed to ensure that it could receive land grant funds. The
state designated Princess Anne Academy an institutional branch of
Morgan College (now Morgan State University) which provided secon-
dary and industrial education for African-Americans who lived along
the eastern shore of Maryland. The state, in 1892, created a contract
between Morgan College and Maryland Agricultural College (now Uni-
versity of Maryland at College Park) whereby Morgan would
essentially serve as an agent or conduit for providing land-grant educa-
tion to African Americans. Consequently, the State of Maryland was
able to receive federal land grant funding and then allocate and allot
eighty percent to Maryland Agricultural College for white students
and twenty percent to Morgan College for African-American students
at Princess Anne Academy.
Under the arrangement concocted by the State of Maryland, it
was not until 1914 that the state actually made any grant directly to
Princess Anne Academy. The federal government objected to the ar-
rangement concocted in Maryland because (1) Princess Anne Academy
was under the control of Morgan College, which was at that time, a
private college, and thus not a state-funded institution of higher educa-
tion and (2) the scholastic level or academic level of Princess Anne
Academy was too low to meet the academic level training requirements
established under the Morrill Act.
The objection by the federal government relating to low scholas-
tic or academic level offerings at Princess Anne Academy was well
founded because the Academy served as a high school from grades
eight through twelve exclusively until 1927. In 1927, it dropped grades
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eight through ten and added two years of college work, and later in
1929, it dropped grades eleven and twelve, and thus provided a junior
college education at the time that the Murray case was being litigated.
In an effort to quell federal government complaints raised in
1915, the state created a contract executed in 1919 by the University of
Maryland and Morgan College which transferred administrative con-
trol of Princess Anne Academy to the University of Maryland, and it
became known as the Eastern Branch of the University of Maryland.
This was merely a slight of hand arrangement because the property
upon which Princess Anne was situated was not transferred or paid for
by the State of Maryland. There was a tacit understanding between
the University of Maryland and Morgan College which would allow the
state to purchase the property upon which Princess Anne was situated
at a price to be agreed upon or fixed by arbitration if, at any time,
either party found the arrangement unsatisfactory. In 1928, after fed-
eral officials made further objections to the arrangement, Morgan
asked for payment under the contract. Despite making several de-
mands for payment, Morgan was finally paid $100,000 in four annual
installments after the Maryland legislature passes legislation in 1935
to purchase Princess Anne Academy.
In addition to purchasing Princess Anne Academy, the Mary-
land Legislature in 1935 authorized a state budget appropriation to
study higher education interests and needs of African-Americans in
Maryland, and to study the interests and needs of Morgan College.
The results of the study, officially entitled the "Report of the Commis-
sion on Higher Education of Negroes to the Governor and Legislature
of Maryland," were issued on January 15, 1937. The report clearly ac-
knowledged the significance of the Murray decision, by observing that
a crisis had arisen with respect to the obligations the State of Mary-
land were required to meet in providing adequate higher education
opportunities for African-Americans. The 1937 report concluded that
while the State of Maryland had generously supported higher educa-
tion of its white population, it had severely neglected the higher
education needs of its African-American population. The report also
concluded that a large investment would have to be made in HBCU
institutions in order to satisfy the "equal" component of the "separate
but equal" doctrine. This investment needed to maintain segregation
would require the outlay of large sums of money to provide educational
facilities for African-Americans which would be equivalent to the facili-
ties provided to whites. The report ultimately recommended that
Maryland purchase Morgan College, an option which represented the
"least public expense" required to provide higher educational opportu-
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nities for African-Americans. Hence, the Murray decision forced the
State of Maryland to purchase Morgan College to develop a nucleus for
higher education opportunity for African-Americans.
The inequality described and outlined in the 1937 report contin-
ued and was again documented a decade later in a 1947 report entitled
"Higher Education in Maryland: A Report of a Survey by the American
Council on Education with Recommendations of the Maryland Com-
mission on Higher Education." The 1947 report found that the State of
Maryland had consistently pursued a policy of providing higher educa-
tion facilities for African-Americans which were inferior to those
provided for whites. The report based the inequality finding based
upon meager appropriations provided to HBCU institutions and the
lower accreditation status for HBCU institutions. The report also
found that the state was not meeting its obligation to provide African-
American students an equal education at HBCU institutions. The re-
port recommended that HBCU institutions needed to be supported at
the same financial level as white higher education institutions for the
state to meet its obligation to provide African-Americans equal educa-
tion opportunities.
Houston was certain that the costs associated with maintaining
separate, but actually equal higher educational facilities would be so
costly to the states, that the states would not be able to afford the price
tag of segregation, and thus segregation would essentially collapse
under its own weight. Houston, however, miscalculated the resolve of
southern states when he predicted that those states would never set up
separate graduate and professional programs for African-American
students. Houston firmly believed that southern states would admit
African-American students rather than provide graduate and profes-
sional education for them using more expensive alternatives. However,
partly in response to the Murray case, southern state legislatures be-
gan to establish graduate and professional educational programs at
black colleges to ensure that the victory garnered in Maryland would
not be adopted in their states. The pattern was fairly predictable in
that an African-American student would seek admission to an all-
white graduate or professional school that would summarily deny the
application because of race. After the denial of admission based upon
race, the state would create a separate program at a state-supported
black college to preserve the all-white separated status of the institu-
tion that had denied admission to the African-American student. A
clear example of this pattern is reflected in the fact that North Caro-
lina, Louisiana, Texas, Florida, Missouri and Oklahoma all created law
schools in response to attempts by African-American students to pur-
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sue legal educational opportunities at all-white institutions within the
borders of their home states.
Because Murray was decided by a state court in Maryland, it
did not have nationwide applicability as binding legal precedent. That
would not happen until 1938, coincidentally the same year that Donald
Murray graduated from the law school at the University of Maryland.
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed segregated public higher education
in 1938 when Lloyd Gaines appealed a decision by the Missouri Su-
preme court denying Gaines the relief he sought. Lloyd Gaines, a 1935
graduate of Lincoln University in Jefferson City, Missouri applied for
admission to the law school at the University of Missouri. The applica-
tion submitted by Gaines in 1935 was ironically submitted the same
year that Donald Murray had applied for admission to the law school
at the University of Maryland. In response to the application Gaines
submitted, S.W. Canada, the Registrar for the University of Missouri,
requested a transcript from Gaines. After submitting a transcript to
Canada, which obviously revealed that Gaines was a graduate of the
state-funded black college in Missouri, he received a rejection letter
advising him to either study law at Lincoln or enroll in an out-of-state
public law school that admitted African-American students that the
state of Missouri would pay for. Gaines' enrollment in another state,
whose public law schools admitted African-American students at Mis-
souri's expense, was the only option available to Gaines, because
Lincoln University did not have a law school. Gaines was interested in
a different option - attending the University Of Missouri School Of
Law.
After Gaines was denied admission to the law school, the
NAACP sued the Registrar of the University of Missouri in a case filed
as Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada in 1936. The trial was presided
over by Judge W. M. Dinwiddie and began on July 10, 1936, and ended
with the judge ruling in favor of the University without even writing
an opinion.
The NAACP appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court and the
issues presented were so significant that the court agreed to hear oral
arguments en banc. The Missouri Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's ruling in favor of the University. In affirming the trial court's
ruling, the Missouri Supreme Court made the following findings: (1)
the established public policy of Missouri was to segregate the races; (2)
the state laws requiring separate schools were not forbidden by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States; (3) that Gaines had not
applied for admission to Lincoln University and that if he had done so,
Lincoln would have been obligated to establish a law school or provide
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him opportunity for legal training elsewhere that would have been sub-
stantially equal to the opportunity provided to white students at the
University of Missouri; (4) that Gaines could have attended law schools
in adjacent states that admitted African-American students which had
sound, comprehensive, and valuable curriculums; and (5) that while
equality was guaranteed to citizens under Plessy, equality did not
mean that Gaines was entitled to the same education that was made
available to whites.
While the Missouri Supreme Court denied Gaines the relief he
sought, the court did strike down a provision in the Missouri statute
that limited the funds available for Gaines to study out of state. Under
the Missouri statute, Gaines would have been entitled only to the dif-
ference between the tuition charged by the University of Missouri and
the cost of attending an out-of-state law school. The Missouri Supreme
Court held that the state of Missouri would have to pay the full tuition
of Gaines to attend a law school in an adjacent state. The holding re-
quired Missouri to pay the full tuition for Gaines to attend an out-of-
state law school, and provided the state of Missouri with ammunition
to shore up a weakness in the state's case. It was now easier for Mis-
souri to distinguish its out-of-state scholarship program from the out-
of-state scholarship program that existed in Maryland that prompted
the Maryland Supreme Court to find the Maryland scholarship was
insufficient.
The Gaines decision was appealed to the United States Su-
preme Court. The Supreme Court overturned the decision by the
Missouri Supreme Court. In ruling for Gaines, the U.S. Supreme
Court found that: (1) the federal constitution required that Missouri
provide for its African-American citizens equal educational opportuni-
ties that could not be shifted to neighboring or adjacent states; (2)
Missouri had to provide within the borders of the state equal educa-
tional opportunities to African Americans; and (3) because Missouri
did not provide a separate but equal law school for Gaines to attend,
Gaines had a personal right to a legal education, which required the
state to furnish him a legal education at the University of Missouri.
The victory in the Gaines case again chipped away at the hold-
ing in Plessy. Gaines gave Houston and the NAACP a federal precedent
that Murray had denied them a victory that had nationwide applicabil-
ity. The significance of the victory in Gaines represented a substantial
step towards dismantling Plessy. The "equalization" strategy had
proven to be successful for a second time and was now on a solid
foundation.
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In a strange turn of events, subsequent to the victory in Gaines,
Lloyd Gaines disappeared into thin air. Gaines was never heard from
again and what actually happened to him has never been discovered.
Soon after the Supreme Court's decision in Gaines, West Virginia State
University began admitting African-American graduate students. Afri-
can-American students earning Master's degrees in education were
Kenneth James in 1941, W.O. Armstrong in 1942 and Victorine Louis-
tall in 1945.
The strategy of not mounting a frontal attack on Plessy was
surely a conservative approach to ending legal segregation. Pursuing
the equalization strategy would give the southern states and border
states time to begin setting up separate graduate and professional pro-
grams for African-American students. In Missouri for example, a law
school was established at Lincoln University in response to the Su-
preme Court's decision in Gaines. A close reading of Gaines makes it
clear that the state of Missouri had the following options to satisfy the
Gaines mandate: 1) admit Gaines to the University of Missouri Law
School; or 2) create a parallel law school at Lincoln University
Due to the disappearance of Lloyd Gaines, a hearing to deter-
mine whether the law school established at Lincoln University
satisfied the state of Missouri's obligation, as articulated in the Gaines
decision was cancelled. The law school established at Lincoln would
eventually close because of the lack of student enrollment. Although
Lloyd Gaines never studied law at the University of Missouri Law
School, his portrait hangs in a prominent place in the law school. The
University of Missouri would not admit an African-American student
until 1950.
While having southern and border states set up separate gradu-
ate and professional programs for African-American students
expanded educational opportunities, these small practical gains did
not necessarily advance the overall goal of ending segregation. How-
ever, African-American leaders of these institutions welcomed these
investments in Historically Black Colleges and University (HBCU) in-
stitutions, even though they probably realized that these states were
more interested in preserving segregation than in promoting equal ed-
ucational opportunities for African-American students. Southern and
border states appeared to use these investments to create an illusion
that they were actually providing something approaching equality, al-
beit in racially segregated and separate institutions. These states were
gambling that legal segregation under the Plessy doctrine would be
preserved by providing investments to shore up the educational offer-
ings and programs at HBCU institutions, as well as the academic
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shortcomings at HBCU institutions. The strategy of enhancing HBCU
institutions after the Gaines case, bolstered the hopes of officials who
wanted to further segregation in higher education and keep the Plessy
doctrine alive. Hence, in the years following Gaines, beginning in the
1940's, officials in favor of maintaining segregation engaged in a strat-
egy to upgrade HBCU institutions in an effort to stave off integration.
Many of these upgrades were disingenuous, ill conceived, and half-
hearted. These officials would use the "improvement" or "enhance-
ment" strategy to argue that "equality" or "substantial equality" had
been achieved at HBCU institutions and thus there was no need for
courts to ever imbue legal rights in African-Americans to enroll in
white educational institutions.
After the victory in Gaines, there was a lull in activity in gradu-
ate and professional school litigation by Houston and Marshall during
the World War II (WWII) years. During the WWII years spanning from
the early to the mid-1940s, the NAACP turned its attention to discrim-
ination in (1) the military; (2) teacher salaries; (3) transportation
facilities; (4) employment; (5) voting rights; and (6) due process af-
forded to African-American defendants in criminal cases.
After WWII, litigation relating to enrollment in graduate and
professional schools was revitalized. Because of the return of
thousands of WWII veterans armed with new government benefits that
could be used to pay for higher education opportunities, the demand for
higher education would increase tremendously. Consequently, there
would be a need to eliminate barriers and enhance access to higher
education opportunities for African-American students at segregated
state-supported colleges and universities.
The first post-war cases were filed in Louisiana and Oklahoma.
In Louisiana, Charles Hatfield, a veteran of WWII and a graduate of
Xavier University of Louisiana, filed a lawsuit in state court seeking
admission to the law school at Louisiana State University (LSU). The
lawsuit was styled as a mandamus action seeking admission into LSU.
Hatfield's request for relief was not granted when officials in Louisiana
hastily put together plans to open a law school at Southern University,
the state supported HBCU institution located in Baton Rouge, Louisi-
ana, a mere twelve miles from the law school at LSU. The opening of
the law school at Southern University ended Hatfield's litigation.
In Oklahoma, Ada Lois Sipuel, an honor student at Langston
College, the separate state supported school for African-American stu-
dents applied for admission to the law school at the University of
Oklahoma. She was denied admission on the grounds that the school
did not admit African-American students. Like Maryland and Mis-
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souri, Oklahoma, which had established separate schools for African-
American students, made no provisions for graduate and professional
school education for African-American students.
The lawsuit was filed in state court in Oklahoma. During the
trial, Marshall was able to elicit an admission from the President of the
University of Oklahoma that Sipuel had an impeccable academic re-
cord and superb academic credentials. The law school denied her
admission simply because of her racial identity. The trial court dis-
missed her case and held that the state of Oklahoma did not have to
admit Sipuel. The trial court also ruled that the state of Oklahoma did
not have to establish or create a law school for African-American stu-
dents unless evidence was provided to show that a sufficient number of
African-American students would attend the new law school.
On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's decision. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that Ada Sipuel's
failure to demand that a separate law school for African-American stu-
dents be established or created prevented her from demanding
admission to the law school at the University of Oklahoma. The court
reasoned that there was no obligation on the state of Oklahoma to es-
tablish a law school for African-American students because there was
not a demand, which justified the expenditures of funds to construct a
law school. Consequently, the court found that Sipuel's Fourteenth
Amendment rights had not been violated because the state of
Oklahoma could not have anticipated the need to create a separate law
school absent a demand from Sipuel.
Marshall appealed the decision of the Oklahoma Supreme
Court to the United States Supreme Court. In the appeal brief, Mar-
shall for the first time presented an argument that essentially
confronted the Plessy doctrine directly. Marshall argued that even if
two schools existed with comparable facilities, the racially segregated
schools could not be equal because there is no such thing as separate
equality.
In a strange turn of events, the Supreme Court issued a unani-
mous unsigned per curiam decision ordering the state to provide Sipuel
a legal education in conformity with the Fourteenth Amendment's
equal protection clause and to do it as soon as it does for applicants of
any other group. The decision was rendered on January 12, 1948. After
the Supreme Court's ruling in favor of Sipuel, the trial court in
Oklahoma subsequently issued an order enjoining the state of
Oklahoma from enrolling any students at the law school until a sepa-
rate law school was created for African-American students.
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It is interesting to note that before the end of January 1948,
both the University of Arkansas and the University of Delaware an-
nounced that each would open its graduate and professional programs
to African-Americans. Neither state waited for further court action af-
ter the Supreme Court had ruled in favor of Ada Sipuel. The decision to
admit African-American students into its graduate and professional
schools by the states of Arkansas and Delaware was probably
prompted by the decision in Sipuel. State officials also had a desire to
avoid costly litigation to prevent pending African-American applicants
from gaining admission to graduate and professional degree programs.
In Arkansas, Silas Hunt sought admission to the law school at the Uni-
versity of Arkansas. While the state of Arkansas had long maintained
a fully segregated system of education, it had no statutory or constitu-
tional provision that mandated exclusion of African-American students
at the University of Arkansas. After the Sipuel decision, state and
school officials created a policy allowing qualified African-American
applicants to seek admission to graduate and professional programs
not offered at Arkansas AM & N (now the University of Arkansas Pine-
Bluff). Silas Hunt enrolled in the law school at the University of Ar-
kansas in February of 1948. He became the first African-American to
enroll in the twentieth century in a historically white publically funded
institution of higher education anywhere in the former Confederacy.
Another student of African-American descent who gained admission
into the University of Arkansas Law School was Jackie L. Shropshere,
who went on to graduate with a law degree in 1951. Meanwhile at the
University of Arkansas Medical School, located in Little Rock, Edith
Mae Irby was admitted in 1948, becoming the first African-American
to be admitted into a historically white medical school anywhere in the
seventeen segregated southern and border states. Irby earned her
medical degree in 1952, becoming the first African-American to gradu-
ate from a historically white medical school anywhere in the seventeen
segregated southern and border states.
In Delaware, state officials had to deal with the fact that three
African-American students had applied for admission into the histori-
cally white University of Delaware. Two of the students applied for
admission into the undergraduate engineering program and the third
student applied for admission into a graduate degree program at the
University of Delaware. On January 31, 1948, the Board of Trustees
for the University met in a special session and made a decision to allow
the admission of African-American students into the University of Del-
aware, if they were bona fide residents of Delaware who sought courses
unavailable to them at Delaware State College (now Delaware State
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University), the state's publicly funded HBCU. African-American stu-
dents who took advantage of the new policy in 1948 included Catherine
J. Young and Cora Berry, who both earned Master's degrees in 1951,
Elbert Whisner who earned a Bachelor's degree in Electrical Engineer-
ing in 1952 and John Henry Taylor who earned a Ph.D in 1953.
While the victory in Sipuel resulted in immediate change in Ar-
kansas and Delaware, a recalcitrant Oklahoma Board of Regents in
1948 hastily created a law school for African-American students in the
state capitol. The school consisted of a roped-off section of the state
capitol building and had three lawyers serving as part-time faculty.
When Marshall took the extraordinary step of returning to the Su-
preme Court to contest the action of the state of Oklahoma in creating
this seemingly fictitious and fake law school, he was shocked to learn
that the Supreme Court determined the "fake" law school created by
the state of Oklahoma satisfied their Fourteenth Amendment obliga-
tion to Ada Sipuel.
Sipuel refused to attend the sham law school. In yet another
bizarre turn of events, Sipuel was finally admitted into the University
of Oklahoma Law School pursuant to a new state law in 1949, which
required her to sit in a part of the classroom that was cordoned or
roped off and designated by a "colored student section" sign. Sipuel en-
rolled in law school in 1949, as the only African-American and the only
female student in a law school with over 300 white male law students.
Ada Sipuel would prove to be one of several African-American women
pioneers in the desegregation of higher education in the south.
In another gradual advancement towards ending segregation in
higher education, Lyman T. Johnson became the first African-Ameri-
can student to enroll into the University of Kentucky. He enrolled as a
graduate student in 1949 after he won a lawsuit in federal court in
March 1949. He was soon followed by fellow African-American stu-
dents, such as Susie Jones Elster and Betty Richardson Newby who
earned graduate degrees in education in 1951; Holloway Fields, an un-
dergraduate who transferred to the University of Kentucky in January
1950 and received a Bachelor's degree in Electrical Engineering in
1951.
The willingness of the U.S. Supreme Court to accept the actions
by the state officials in Oklahoma as satisfying their obligations under
the Fourteenth Amendment prompted the NAACP to shift their strat-
egy away from "equalization" and to launch an all-out frontal assault
on segregation in education. Under the new all-out offensive on segre-
gation, the NAACP took the position that the establishment of new
educational offerings and programs at HBCU institutions were dupli-
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cative and wasteful investments that impeded the goals of (1) ending
segregation in education and (2) opening access to white universities
for African-American students. Hence, new investments, improve-
ments, and enhancements at publicly-funded HBCU institutions were
viewed as attempts on the part of southern and border states to make
racially segregated separate schools more equal in the hope of avoiding
integration and over-turning the Plessy doctrine.
The new frontal attack on Plessy came in the form of the follow-
ing arguments: (1) separate education for African-American students
was necessarily unequal; (2) the very act of legalized racial segregation
was offensive to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment; and (3) African-American students could never receive a truly
equal education in a segregation setting.
The new frontal assault on Plessy gave no consideration of the
positive impact that HBCU institutions might have or had in an inte-
grated scheme of higher education. This view was reflected in an essay
published in 1949 by Hylan Lewis. Lewis argued that a system of
higher education for African-American students would remain inade-
quate and warped as long as publicly-funded HBCU institutions
continued to existed and be supported. Hence, the new legal strategy of
the NAACP appeared to leave little or no room for publicly funded or
state-supported HBCU institutions once the goal of obtaining legal ac-
cess to white state-supported universities had been achieved.
Court cases decided in 1950 would further lay the groundwork
needed to overturn Plessy. The first court case decided in 1950 that
would set in place the momentum needed to eventually overturn Plessy
was McCredy v. Byrd. In 1949, Ester McCreddy applied for admission
into the nursing school at the University of Maryland located in Balti-
more. She was denied admission because she was African-American.
McCready met all of the educational and character requirements
needed for admission. Rather than offer admission to the nursing
school, the University of Maryland in August 1949 offered McCready
an opportunity to study nursing at Meharry Medical College School of
Nursing, in Nashville, Tennessee. Meharry Medical School and its
school of nursing provided nursing education to African-American stu-
dents. McCready declined the offer, and sued for admission into the
University of Maryland.
McCready was represented by Thurgood Marshall and Donald
Murray, became the first African-American to gain admission into the
law school at the University of Maryland in 1935. After the Baltimore
City Court ruled against McCready, an appeal was filed. On appeal,
the state of Maryland argued that state and federal rulings in law
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school cases such as Murray, Gaines, and Sipuel should not govern the
outcome in McCready because nursing and law were different kinds of
curricula. The state argued that the need to study law within the state
where one would be practicing made it a special case. The state further
argued that nursing learned in Nashville, Tennessee at Meharry would
be pretty much identical to the training at the University of Maryland
in Baltimore.
The Maryland Supreme Court ruled that the offer did not sat-
isfy McCready's constitutional right to attend a school within the state
of Maryland. The court held that if whites could attend an in-state
school, African-Americans could not be constitutionally forced to go
outside the state for similar training. After she won her case, Mc-
Cready enrolled in the University of Maryland and graduated in 1953.
The second case essentially involved an opportunity for
Thurgood Marshall to engage in a rematch with officials from the state
of Oklahoma. As result of the admission of Ada Sipuel, other African-
American students in Oklahoma could enroll in graduate and profes-
sional schools in Oklahoma. However, none could sit next to their
white classmates and they were either condoned or roped off to the side
or back of the classroom. Marshall took the state of Oklahoma back to
court to determine if the state of Oklahoma could admit African-Ameri-
can students and thereafter segregate them within a classroom.
The client Marshall represented in the rematch with the state
of Oklahoma was George W. McLaurin, an African-American professor
at Langston University. Professor McLaurin, who applied for admis-
sion to the graduate school of education, was denied admission. A suit
was filed in federal court before a three-judge panel pursuant to a pro-
cedure created by the Judiciary Act of 1937 that allowed constitutional
challenges to state statues to be heard by special three-judge panels in
U.S. District Courts. Judgments entered by the panels could be ap-
pealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court without having to go
through the normal appellate process. The decision to file suit in fed-
eral district court represented a change in strategy from filing lawsuits
in state court.
During the pendency of the suit, Professor McLaurin was even-
tually admitted into the graduate education program at the University
of Oklahoma. McLaurin was allowed to sit in the same classes as
whites but was segregated from white students in a manner similar to
the way Ada Sipuel was segregated from her classmates at the law
school. McLaurin was required to: (a) sit apart at a designated desk in
an outer room adjoining the classroom; (b) sit at a designated desk on
the mezzanine floor of the library; (c) avoid using the desks in the regu-
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lar reading room; and (d) sit at a designated table and to dine at a
different time from the other students in the school cafeteria.
During the pendency of the litigation, the following modifica-
tions were made: (a) the rail surrounding the section of the classroom
in which McLaurin sat was removed; (b) the sign stating "reserved for
colored" was removed; (c) McLaurin was assigned to a seat in the class-
room in the row specified for "colored" students; (d) McLaurin was
allowed to dine at the same time as white students at his own special
table.
The three-judge panel had to consider whether McLaurin, as an
admitted student at the University of Oklahoma, was accorded equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment in a University where he
was isolated from white students in the classroom, library, and dining
facility.
The three-judge panel ruled that McLaurin's constitutional
rights had not been violated. After the trial court entered a judgment
in favor of the University of Oklahoma, an appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court was filed.
The Mclaurin appeal was argued on April 3 and 4, 1950. The
U.S. Supreme Court on June 5, 1950 overruled the three-judge panel.
The court ruled that the segregation McLaurin endured within the
University of Oklahoma violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to
equal protection. The court found that the actions of the University of
Oklahoma to segregate McLuarin from white students within the uni-
versity handicapped him in his pursuit to effective graduate
instruction. The court reasoned that the restrictions imposed upon
McLaurin impaired and inhibited his ability to study, engage in discus-
sions and exchange views with other students, and to learn his
profession.
The actions by the state of Oklahoma in McLaurin helped to
dramatically illustrate the stigmatizing impact of segregation on Afri-
can-Americans. Because the Supreme Court ruled that segregation
within the classroom, library or cafeteria violated the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Ada Sipuel, who filed the first
lawsuit challenging the practices of state officials in Oklahoma, was
able to take her place in a front-row seat at the law school.
At the same time that Marshall and the NAACP were engaged
in a battle royale with the state of Oklahoma, another battle was con-
temporaneously being waged in Texas against the University of Texas
School of Law on behalf of Hemon Marion Sweatt. Marshall thought
that a lawsuit against the University of Texas School of Law was an
even better case than the case he was litigating on behalf of Ada Sipuel
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in Oklahoma. Sweatt was a WWII veteran who held a Bachelor's de-
gree in Biology. The only work Sweatt could find was in the U.S. Postal
Service. Sweatt, who was denied a promotion to a desk job, decided
that he wanted to become a lawyer, in part, to sue the Postal Service.
On February 26, 1946, Sweatt applied for admission to the Uni-
versity of Texas School of Law. Sweatt was denied admission because
he was African-American. Sweatt was otherwise qualified for admis-
sion into the University of Texas School of Law. Denial of admission to
Sweatt by the University of Texas presented a monumental problem
for Texas state officials because there was no other state supported law
school in Texas that African-American students could attend. The
state of Texas was clearly not adhering to its constitutional obligation
as articulated in the Murray and Gaines cases. Sweatt filed a lawsuit
in May 1946, approximately one month after Ada Sipuel had filed her
lawsuit against the state of Oklahoma.
Sweatt's lawsuit was filed in Texas state court. A hearing was
held in June 1946 and was presided over by Judge Roy C. Archer.
Judge Archer ruled that the state of Texas violated the United States
Constitution because it did not provide access to law school for African-
American students while simultaneously denying them admission to
the University of Texas.
Texas state officials, unlike their counterparts in Maryland,
Missouri, or Oklahoma, began a frantic scramble to establish and open
a law school for African-American residents who would seek a legal
education. The state initially responded by renting a few rooms in
Houston, Texas and hiring two attorneys to serve as faculty for the
new law school. At a status conference in December 1946, Judge
Archer found that the facilities in Houston were "substantially equal"
to the University of Texas School of Law located in Austin, Texas.
Marshall appealed the ruling of Judge Archer. Ironically, as the
lawsuit progressed and the appeal was pending, the state of Texas took
several steps in an attempt to bolster the finding of "substantial equal-
ity" made by Judge Archer. The location of the law school established
for African-American students was transferred to Austin, pending the
construction of a permanent facility in Houston. The new law school
opened temporarily in the basement quarters of the Texas State Capi-
tol building with three university of Texas law professors assigned to
the staff of the new law school.
After much debate and prodding, the state legislature appropri-
ated three million dollars to create the Texas State University for
Negroes (now Texas Southern University) and designated one hundred
thousand dollars for the creation of a law school. With the appropria-
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tion, Texas State University was evolving from a hastily contrived law
school operating out of a basement in Austin to a growing university
that was adding a liberal arts college, a graduate school, a school of
pharmacy, and a law school with new facilities and a law library. These
developments weakened the Sweatt case on the issue of physical ine-
quality and put the plaintiff in a somewhat uncomfortable position of
opposing remedial measures that would have the impact of enhancing
and improving the quality of HBCU institutions that were criticized for
academic shortcomings attributable to woeful funding from state legis-
latures. Because of the change in circumstances attributable to the
finding appropriated by the state legislature for the Mrican-Ameri-
cans, the case was remanded to Judge Archer for a full evidentiary
hearing.
At the hearing, Marshall worked diligently to develop a more
precise record for appeal. He assembled an array of experts to testify at
the hearing. Those experts included professors and deans from some of
the most prestigious law schools in the country, including Rudy
Rendenfield, the only person known to hold doctorate degrees in both
anthropology and law. The experts testified that segregation had no
scientific basis in public schools and that there was no scientific basis
for the general assumption concerning the inherent intellectual inferi-
ority of African-American students.
The university's legal team, led by Price Daniel, attempted to
undermine the testimony of the expert witnesses presented by Mar-
shall on cross-examination. The legal team also on cross-examination
attempted to paint Sweatt as simply a pawn for the NAACP. A month
after the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Archer ruled in the favor of
the University of Texas. The case was appealed to the Texas Court of
Civil Appeals. On February 25, 1948, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
affirmed the ruling of Judge Archer. Over the next two years, as the
case labored through the appellate courts to the U.S. Supreme Court,
state officials in Texas redoubled their efforts to buttress their conten-
tion that the new university for African-American students was in fact
a credible higher education institution. The university had grown to
enrollment of 2,300 between 1947 and 1950. Oral arguments in the
appeal filed in the Sweatt case were heard on April 4, 1950, one day
after oral arguments were made in the McLaurin case. The decision in
the Sweatt case was announced on June 5, 1950, the same day as the
decision was announced in McLaurin. In a unanimous decision, the
U.S. Supreme Court ordered Heman Sweatt to be admitted into the
University of Texas School of Law, despite the fact that the State of
Texas had established and opened for African-Americans a law school
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that arguably had state-of-the-art physical facilities. Creating a sepa-
rate new law school for African-Americans failed to satisfy the state's
constitutional mandate to provide equal protection for African-Ameri-
can residents of Texas because:
[t]he University of Texas Law School possess to a far greater degree
those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but
which make for greatness in a law school. Such qualities, to name
but a few, include reputation of the faculty, experience of the ad-
ministration, position and influence of the alumni, standing,
traditions, and prestige. It is difficult to believe that one who had a
free choice between these law schools would consider the choice
close.
It is also important to note that the Supreme Court in Sweatt found
that the facilities available at the newly established law school were
not equal in quantity or quality to those available at the University of
Texas Law School. According to the Court, "[iln terms of number of the
faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for specialization, size of a
student body, scope of library, availability of law review and similar
activities, the University of Texas Law School is superior."
The Supreme Court vindicated the NAACP's position in part
when it determined that the frenetic and frantic efforts to enhance Af-
rican American education under the "separate but equal" doctrine did
not negate their constitutional duty to admit Heman Sweatt to the
University of Texas Law School on an equal basis. While the court re-
jected the assertion by the state of Texas that the creation of a law
school for African-Americans provided an equal opportunity to a legal
education, the court refused to adopt the NAACP's position that the
Plessy vs. Ferguson decision should be overturned. The Sweatt deci-
sion, however, put the NAACP closer to its goal of overturning the
Plessy doctrine. If compelling African Americans to attend separate
law schools denied African Americans certain intangible benefits that
would be theirs in an integrated setting, the NAACP reasoned that the
same might be true of segregation in elementary and secondary
schools.
Similarly, when the U.S. Court ruled that George McLaurin
was entitled to equal treatment within the classroom so that he could
be involved in interactions within his white classmates, the Plessy doc-
trine surely was on shaky ground. Hence, if forcing a student, on
account of his race, to sit just outside an all-white class violated that
student's constitutional rights, how could forcing thousands of stu-
dents on account of their race to sit in buildings separate from all-
white schools not violate their rights?
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With favorable decisions in Sweatt and McLauren, the stage
was finally set for a direct frontal assault on Plessy. Consequently, the
groundwork had been laid for the groundwork for the case that would
turn out to be a momentous assault on segregation in education -
Brown v. Board of Education.
The more immediate impact of McLaurin and Sweatt was to
narrow the basis on which racial discrimination in higher education
could survive constitutional challenge. For example, in Missouri, a de-
cision rendered by the Circuit Court of Cole County on June 27, 1950
ruled that Gus T. Redgel could enroll in a Master's degree program in
Economics at the University of Missouri at Columbia because the Uni-
versity could not exclude African-American students who were
residents from enrolling in programs that were unavailable to such
students at Lincoln University. That court also ruled that Elmer Bell,
Jr. and George Everett Horne had a right to be admitted as first-year
engineering students in the School of Mines and Mettaburgy of the
University of Missouri at Rolla, Missouri because they could not pur-
sue the same degree at Lincoln University as African Americans.
Likewise in Delaware, a Delaware state trial court on August 9, 1950,
issued a ruling allowing Brooks M. Parker and several other African-
American undergraduate students to transfer from Delaware State
College (Delaware State University), the state-supported HBCU, to the
University of Delaware because Delaware State was "woefully inferior
to the university of Delaware in the physical facilities available to and
in the educational opportunities offered its undergraduates in the
school of Arts and Sciences."
In Virginia, Gregory Swanson was admitted into University of
Virginia in September 1950 as a result of federal court litigation.
Swanson was an African American who desired admission into the law
school at the University of Virginia and no HBCU in Virginia offered
access to legal education to African-American students. Similarly, Vir-
ginia Polytechnic Institute (Now Virginia Tech University) admitted
Irving L. Peddrew, III to study electrical engineering, because Virginia
State University did not offer African-American students an opportu-
nity to study electrical engineering. Rather than take a chance on
being sued if it had denied Peddrew admission as an undergraduate
student because of his race, the school admitted him in 1953. Virginia
Polytechnic Institute became the first historically white undergradu-
ate publicly funded institute in any of the states of the former
Confederacy to admit an African-American undergraduate student.
Peddrew was for African-American undergraduate students what Silas
Hunt had been for graduate and professional students.
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Unfortunately, in Maryland, despite the fact that the earliest
victory to provide access to higher education opportunities for African-
American students occurred in Maryland, officials in Maryland contin-
ued to engage in obstructionist tactics designed to thwart the progress
of African-American students to desegregate higher education in Mary-
land. The University of Maryland sustained obstinacy and resistance
to allowing African-American students to enroll in graduate and pro-
fessional programs unavailable at an HBCU in Maryland continued for
several years after losing its battle to prohibit the enrollment of Donal
Murray into the University of Maryland Law School. Shortly after, the
United States Supreme Court had issued rulings in McLaurin and
Sweatt, Thurgood Marshall and Donald Murray scored a resounding
victory on behalf of Parren J. Mitchell that led to the admission of
Mitchell to the University of Maryland's main campus at College Park
to pursue a Master's degree in Sociology. Mitchell, a WWII veteran,
had earned an undergraduate degree at Morgan State College (now
Morgan State University), a state-supported HBCU. Mitchell was de-
nied admission because of his race. Mitchell sued the University and
took his case to city court in Baltimore. In October 1950, the trial judge
in Baltimore ordered the University of Maryland to admit him to the
graduate program in Sociology.
Marshall and Murray also represented Hiram Whittle, another
African-American resident of Baltimore, who wanted to study electri-
cal engineering at the College Park campus of the University of
Maryland. Whittle was denied admission on racial grounds. In Janu-
ary 1951, shortly before his trial was about to commence, the
University decided to admit Whittle as the first African-American un-
dergraduate student to be admitted at the University of Maryland. In
1951, the University of Maryland also admitted two African-American
applicants to medical school - Donald Stewart and Roderick E. Charles,
both residents of Baltimore.
The work of Charles Hamilton Houston, Thurgood Marshall
and other attorneys who litigated higher education cases designated to
provide access to higher education for African-Americans and to lay a
foundation to overturn the Plessy doctrine was difficult and tedious.
Unfortunately, Charles Hamilton Houston did not live to see the full
fruit of his labor. He died in 1950, four years prior to the historic U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education, which over-
turned the Plessy doctrine and unanimously announced that legal
segregation in public education was unconstitutional.
On the afternoon of May 17, 1954, United States Supreme
Court Chief Justice Earl Warren announced the Supreme Court's deci-
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sion in Brown v. Board of Education. History was made when Warren
read the following words: "Does segregation of children in public
schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities
and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive the children of the
minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it
does. Warren then read the following historical words into the record:
"We conclude-unanimously - that, in the field of public education, the
doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational fa-
cilities are inherently unequal."
With the Supreme Court's decision in Brown, the NAACP had
accomplished its goal of overturning Plessy v. Ferguson. Plessy was
dead and no longer the law of the land. The NAACP viewed desegrega-
tion as the right of African-Americans as individuals to have legal
access to white institutions on the same basis as any other citizen. In
the 1955 re-arguments in the remedial phase of Brown, the NAACP
attempted to persuade the Supreme Court to mandate specific dead-
lines for desegregation of schools. The Supreme Court however issued
a vague ruling in what is now known as Brown II. The Brown II ruling
was a vague pronouncement that lacked definite standards or timeta-
bles for desegregating education systems. Implementation related to
desegregation in education was passed to lower federal courts which
were given wide latitude to implement desegregation "in good faith"
and "with all deliberate speed." The Court failed to elaborate on what
it meant by "good faith" and "with all deliberate speed," and it failed to
(1) issue any specific decrees, (2) promulgate any minimum steps re-
quired to satisfy the court's mandates, or (3) give timetables for the
accomplishment of its directives. The court in Brown II even failed to
provide specific relief to the plaintiffs.
The Court's failure to issue orders admitting the plaintiffs into
all-white schools on an equal basis was clearly contrary to the ap-
proach used in graduate and professional school cases where the court
issued orders to admit African-American students into all-white gradu-
ate or professional schools.
The Supreme Court's actions in Brown II created an opportu-
nity for Maryland and other southern states to delay higher education
desegregation efforts. In this vein, the State of Maryland engaged in
foot dragging with respect to higher education desegregation.
The Brown decision led directly to minor policy changes in Ma-
ryland in that African-Americans could now seek admission into
undergraduate degree programs in Maryland's historically white or
traditionally white institutions (TWIs) of higher education. In 1954,
those institutions included: the University of Maryland at College
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Park; the University of Maryland at Baltimore; Towson State Univer-
sity; Frostburg State University; and Salisbury State University.
Hence, in 1954 when Brown I was decided, the State of Maryland oper-
ated five TWI's and four HBCU institutions under its de jure
segregated system of higher education. It is interesting to note that
while Maryland during Plessy de jure era had a policy of segregated
higher education, except where legal decisions required otherwise, pri-
vate higher education institutions such as John Hopkins University,
Loyola College, and St. John's College Annapolis began admitting Afri-
can-American students in 1935. Hence, at the time of the Brown I
decision, only a marginal number of students were admitted to publicly
funded TWI's because they were only eligible for admission if the de-
gree courses sought were not offered at one of the state's publicly
funded HBCU institutions.
Following Brown I and Brown II, the State of Maryland did
nothing more than merely lift the rule excluding African-American stu-
dents from being admitted into and attending TWIs. Maryland
officially ended de jure segregation in its public accommodations in re-
sponse to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. While African-Americans were
now able to utilize libraries, restaurants, and housing once unavailable
to them because of their race and skin color, African-American enroll-
ment in TWIs remained minimal.
In Maryland, the de jure era of segregation in higher education
extended through 1969, when the federal government put the State of
Maryland on notice that it operated an illegally segregated dual sys-
tem of higher education. In fact, in a 2005 Maryland Attorney General
opinion, the State of Maryland admitted that "there is no doubt that
Maryland operated a de jure segregated public higher education sys-
tem before 1969, when federal officials found the state in violation of
Title VI and that some policies, such as program duplication at geo-
graphically proximate schools are traceable to the era."
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